The foreign policy of small states is constrained by the size and location of the country and its natural resources and population.
With both nations already sharing a disputed border, it would be in India’s interest to avoid challenging China in the wider Indo-Pacific region.
US President Donald Trump has thrown his support behind the notion of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’.
Some critics have compared the US pledge of $113 million to the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ with China’s $1-trillion-worth Belt and Road Initiative, making them regard this US effort laughable.
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo began his visit to Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia with a plan to invest $113 million in the Indo-Pacific region.
A ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) seems to be a work in progress and it is still not clear how much support it could garner from Asean member states.
Manila will readily support the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy in the context of enhancing its defence ties with the United States as the Duterte administration tries to balance its relations with China, writes Christian Vicedo.
Taking a non-confrontational approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative is sensible when the new US and Australian financial resources being contributed to an alternative are so comparatively modest.
If the Quad cannot make clear how it addresses three inherent contradictions in its revival of the ‘Indo-Pacific’, it will not achieve the support of Asean states.
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is looking to support American infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia.
Is the much heralded ‘Asian Century’ now losing its significance with the US-led Indo-Pacific concept which seeks to redefine geographical boundaries?
Asean and Japan’s senior officials participating in the 33rd Asean-Japan Forum in Tokyo last week reaffirmed the importance of the Asean-Japan Strategic Partnership.
David Shambaugh writes that Washington should substantially raise Southeast Asia as a strategic priority in its Asian and global foreign policy and argues that it is too important a region, for the United States, to cede to China.
What remains of Australian international broadcasting content largely mirrors the country to itself, rather than reaching out to engage audiences across cultural and political frontiers.
The most effective regional frameworks are virtuous cycles. They are built on key state-to-state relations among members and reinforce and strengthen these same relations.
Never before have ties between the US and Cambodia been so low, since 1997. The bilateral relationship now is close to hitting rock-bottom level with a lack of mutual trust and understanding between both countries.
The Mekong-Japan cooperation and the Indo-Pacific strategy are connected and Cambodia is well placed geographically to link Asean in the two frameworks, writes Chheang Vannarith.
The Indo-Pacific strategy for all intents and purposes is used by the US to counterbalance the rise of China. This, argues Su Hao, is dangerous and could lead Asian nations toward confrontation, rather than promote regional peace.
The term “Indo-Pacific” has become widely resonant as a diplomatic and geopolitical construct, especially at the highest levels of Australian, Indian, Japanese, and US governments.