After more than a year of deliberation, ASEAN adopted the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ (‘the Outlook’) on 23 June 2019. The Outlook then got an airing at the ASEAN Regional Forum meetings in Bangkok.
ASEAN will look back at the unveiling of its Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) at the 34th Asean Summit in Bangkok last week as a moment of truth.
Asean leaders have adopted the Indo Pacific Outlook at the 34th Asean Summit in Bangkok this month to show their unity and centrality to claim Asean leadership and ownership in shaping regional architecture.
As trade relations between the United States and China grow more rivalrous, the situation in the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly vexed.
Regarding Asean as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, Cambodia has proactively and responsibly participated in the Asean Community building.
The history of the last several decades suggests that we have very limited capacity to encourage positive change in China, certainly not by offering yet more rewards and inducements. We need to deal with China as it is, not how we might wish it to be.
Across the globe and especially in the Indo-Pacific region, women are playing significant roles – some are serving in the government, some are actively involved in the private sector, and some are vigorously fighting for social causes.
Diverse perspectives on the idea of ‘Indo-Pacific’ are resulting in a lack of clarity on this concept. As a framework, the Indo-Pacific seeks to create a connected multipolar Asia that must be governed by commonly agreed international norms, rules and practices.
There is no consensus on what the Indo-Pacific concept will cover. It is not clear what kind of structure is needed for such an Indo-Pacific construct.
The United States will work with like-minded nations, from India to the Pacific islands, to advance their shared interests, writes Mike Pence.
As China’s interests continue to expand, so too does its desire to participate in global affairs. But contrary to some recent commentary, which seems to rattle the US, it seems unlikely that ‘world power’ or ‘world domination’ are China’s priorities, writes Neil Thomas.
The foreign policy of small states is constrained by the size and location of the country and its natural resources and population.
With both nations already sharing a disputed border, it would be in India’s interest to avoid challenging China in the wider Indo-Pacific region.
US President Donald Trump has thrown his support behind the notion of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’.
Some critics have compared the US pledge of $113 million to the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ with China’s $1-trillion-worth Belt and Road Initiative, making them regard this US effort laughable.
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo began his visit to Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia with a plan to invest $113 million in the Indo-Pacific region.
A ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) seems to be a work in progress and it is still not clear how much support it could garner from Asean member states.
Manila will readily support the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy in the context of enhancing its defence ties with the United States as the Duterte administration tries to balance its relations with China, writes Christian Vicedo.
Taking a non-confrontational approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative is sensible when the new US and Australian financial resources being contributed to an alternative are so comparatively modest.
If the Quad cannot make clear how it addresses three inherent contradictions in its revival of the ‘Indo-Pacific’, it will not achieve the support of Asean states.
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is looking to support American infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia.
Is the much heralded ‘Asian Century’ now losing its significance with the US-led Indo-Pacific concept which seeks to redefine geographical boundaries?
Asean and Japan’s senior officials participating in the 33rd Asean-Japan Forum in Tokyo last week reaffirmed the importance of the Asean-Japan Strategic Partnership.
David Shambaugh writes that Washington should substantially raise Southeast Asia as a strategic priority in its Asian and global foreign policy and argues that it is too important a region, for the United States, to cede to China.
What remains of Australian international broadcasting content largely mirrors the country to itself, rather than reaching out to engage audiences across cultural and political frontiers.
The most effective regional frameworks are virtuous cycles. They are built on key state-to-state relations among members and reinforce and strengthen these same relations.
Never before have ties between the US and Cambodia been so low, since 1997. The bilateral relationship now is close to hitting rock-bottom level with a lack of mutual trust and understanding between both countries.
The Mekong-Japan cooperation and the Indo-Pacific strategy are connected and Cambodia is well placed geographically to link Asean in the two frameworks, writes Chheang Vannarith.
The Indo-Pacific strategy for all intents and purposes is used by the US to counterbalance the rise of China. This, argues Su Hao, is dangerous and could lead Asian nations toward confrontation, rather than promote regional peace.
The term “Indo-Pacific” has become widely resonant as a diplomatic and geopolitical construct, especially at the highest levels of Australian, Indian, Japanese, and US governments.